Norms of assertion
Linguistic communication occupies a central place in human life, and most human practices heavily rely on it. In uttering a string of meaningful words, we can pursue different goals: Ask a question, give an order, make a request. Most of our utterances, however, are assertions, that is, roughly, utterances by means of which we express beliefs (Williamson, 2002: 74) . A question that has received a lot of attention in philosophy of language and linguistics recently regards the conditions under which we are warranted to make assertions.
Inquiries of this sort frequently (though not necessarily) presuppose that (i) assertions of different sorts form a unified type of linguistic move or speech act, and (ii) that 'the speech act [of assertion], like a game and unlike the act of jumping, is constituted by rules.' (Williamson, 1996: 489) . Roughly, the presumption is that just as the rules of a particular game constitutively define the game and enable us to play it, the rules of assertion define and sustain the social practice of assertion. What kinds of rules? Four proposals dominate the literature (for recent reviews, cf. e.g. Goldberg, 2015; Pagin, 2016; Weiner, 2007) : , 2002; Benton, 2011; Brandom, 1998; DeRose, 1996 DeRose, , 2002 Hawthorne, 2003; Turri, 2011; Williamson, 1996 Williamson, , 2002 for early accounts, cf. Black, 1952; Searle, 1976; Unger, 1975) The requirements which the above accounts 1 impose on the speaker differ considerably. Whereas on the last two views, the norm of assertion is factive, on the first two accounts it is acceptable to make an assertion that p even if p is false. Besides the debate regarding which of the above rules is the most promising contender for a norm of assertion, another dispute concerns the appropriate degree of normative force of the rule. 2 It makes a big difference whether the norm stipulates that one 'must ' (Williamson, 2002) , 'should' (Douven, 2006; Turri, 2013) , 'may' (Turri, 2014) or 'is in a position to ' (Dummett, 1959) assert that p only if p is known (or true, or believed with justification).
